This paper constructs a life-cycle model with intergenerational linkages to study wealth transfers between parents and children. Households are subject to stochastic earnings, and parents care about their children. While the parents are of working age, the utility of the children's consumption enters the utility of the parents. In addition, when they die, parents like to leave bequests to their children, and have an (exogenous) warm-glow utility from leaving a bequest. The paper studies how a borrowing constraint influences parental transfers. A tightening of borrowing constraints (that prevent children from borrowing to smooth their consumption) tends to generate larger inter vivos transfers early in life (relative to bequests). This matches the empirical evidence from Korea (a stricter constraints country) and the US. The paper also studies how transfers are impacted by allowing children to use parental wealth as collateral to borrow, and by different taxes. Borrowing constraints also have implications on the wealth distribution as a tighter borrowing constraint implies a drop in the Gini coefficient of wealth.
Introduction
In this paper, we investigate the implications of intergenerational transfers with specific emphasis on the motive and the timing of the private transfer motives and the role of borrowing constraints in Korea and the United States.
Since Becker's (1974) [6] analysis of parental investment in children, there have been several studies analysing the size and the effect of parental transfers to children, both inter vivos transfers to younger children, and bequests. Becker's model provides a first step towards understanding the difference between the two forms of transfers. In particular, it highlights the role of borrowing constraints. While under a perfect capital market, the optimal timing of intergenerational transfers is indeterminate, borrowing constraints may induce the parents to transfer resources to constrained children (who tend to be younger) rather than leaving it for later bequests.
The most direct reference that relates borrowing constraints and intergenerational transfers comes from Cox (1990) [12] , which investigates whether intervivos transfers are aimed towards liquidity-constrained households by using a data set containing information on private transfers and consumer balance sheets in the United States. Another empirical evidence is provided by Guiso and Japelli (2002) [16] which investigates Italian household data and suggests that housing market imperfections motivate the timing of transfers in conjunction with parental considerations that control behavioral incentives for their children. The paper estimates that inter vivos transfers shorten the saving time required to purchase a house by about two years and allow households to purchase considerably larger houses.
I set up a general equilibrium lifecycle model for the United States and Korea and calibrate the model to match the aggregate level of wealth and the ratio of intervivos transfer to total bequests. The model features both bequest and intervivos transfers. While the motive for bequest in the model is 'impure' in the sense that parents derive utility from leaving bequest 1 , which could be viewed as a 'selfish' motive, intervivos transfers are modelled such that the parents directly care about the consumption of their children and provide transfers out of 'pure' altruism. Next, I evaluate the model along dimensions not specifically matched by construction by looking at age-wealth profile, intergenerational transfers, and the overall wealth distribution. After highlighting the fit of the model, I
assess some quantitative roles played by the borrowing constraint as well as other counterfactual policy changes.
For borrowing constraint, tightening the constraint in the US is simulated by lowering the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) from 75% to 25%, which leads to higher transfers For Korea, a reverse simulation of increasing the LTV from 25% to 75% implies a reverse re-distribution of wealth across generations with cohorts aged 55 and above becoming wealthier while the younger cohorts become poorer. Subsequently, average bequest also increases by 5.9 percent. While transfers to children aged 25-30 decrease by 8% due to a more relaxed borrowing constraint, the average intervivos transfer increases by 9% as a result of a widening wealth gap between the parents and the children. The transfer-tobequest ratio therefore increases by 2.4% points. In terms of wealth distribution, relaxing borrowing constraint raises the Gini coefficient of wealth from 0.63 to 0.663.
Next, we simulate a numerical experiment of enabling parental assets as partial collateral by assuming that the children can borrow up to 25% of the assets held by their parents. In Korea, the qualitative implications are similar to the simulation of relaxing borrowing constraint. For the US, capital output ratio declines by 2% and average wealth declines for all cohorts, which also lowers the bequest left by the deceased (-3%). On the other hand, allowing for parental assets to be partially collateralized lowers the need for parental intervivos transfers. Thus, transfers to cohorts aged 25-30, 30-35, and 35-40 fall by 17%, 6%, and 3%, respectively.
Furthermore, we conduct several counter-factual experiments such as eliminating the social security system, increasing the tax rate on consumption, lowering the tax rate on capital income under government revenue neutrality assumption for robustness check of our model. This paper adds to the rich empirical literature on market imperfection and intergenerational transfers started out with Bruce and Waldman (1990) [9] and Altig and Davis (1992) [3] , among others. In terms of the model set-up, this paper is closest to the work done by Fuster, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2008) [14] , which looks at the welfare effects of revenue-neutral tax reforms calibrated to the United States economy for a dynastic and a pure life-cycle economy framework. However, this paper distinguishes itself in two different aspects: First, the two extreme set-ups proposed by Fuster, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2008) [14] are unclear about matching the age-wealth profile or the overall distribution of wealth in the data. This paper proposes a single model featuring both dynastic and life-cycle aspects with the family as a tool for insurance and explicitly documents the age-wealth profile and the overall distribution of wealth. Second, as pointed out byÁbráham (2008) [1] , there is no borrowing in the model specification of Fuster, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu [14] , which may limit the implications of intergenerational transfers and welfare. This paper, on the other hand, endogenizes borrowing constraint into the model by incorporating the notion that children can borrow against their current income but also the asset of their parents as partial collateral, which is empirically more plausible.
In terms of calibration methodology, the paper takes similar approach to Nishiyama (2002) [25] The main features of wealth over the life cycle are summarized as follows:
1. The profiles of net worth show hump-shaped pattern in both countries, but the peak reaches at the ages of 65-70 in the United States and 50-55 in Korea. This difference can be attributed to the difference in the retirement age (65 in the United States versus 60 in Korea), but also the fact that the cross-section data does not take into account the lifecycle effects (time, age, and cohort effects).
2. Another difference comes from the level of wealth held across different age groups.
For households aged 55 and above, the American households hold significantly larger amount of wealth than the Korean households. Comparing the net worth held at the peak ages, the US households hold more than 60 percent more wealth than the Korean households at their peak level. On the other hand, for younger households in Korea hold more wealth than the US counterparts.
Transfer Wealth
People accumulate wealth from different sources. As indicated by Gale and Scholz (1994) [15], one source of wealth is lifecycle wealth, which comes from precautionary savings or saving for retirement, among other reasons. Another source comes from transfers, usually from within close families in the case of private transfers and from the government in the case of public transfers. There has been studies in the US economy as for estimating the share of intergenerational transfers as a fraction of total net worth, as well as the composition of intergenerational transfers. Gale and Scholz (1994) [15] uses the annual flow of Intervivos transfers and bequests from the Survey of Consumer Finances to estimate the stock of transfer wealth. The figures were around 21% and 31%, respectively. Villanueva [28] reports the annual flow of bequests in the United States to be around 2.6% of the GDP, and the annual flow of intervivos transfers is about a third of the flow of bequests. 
Evidence of Borrowing Constraints
Among many other factors, this paper focuses on the role of borrowing constraints in accounting for the differences in wealth accumulation and the intergenerational transfers.
Borrowing constraints differ among countries in terms of magnitude. One way to compare the degree of borrowing constraint is to compare household credit and mortgage markets.
Lam (2002) [22] reports the differences in household credit and mortgage markets in Korea and the US by comparing the difference in the outstanding mortgage-GDP ratio and the loan to value ratios. First, mortgage-GDP ratio in Korea during 1996-2000 have been around 20 percent the level of the US, indicating lower access for Korean households to tap into the credit market. Similar story holds for the loan to value ratio, measuring the fraction in which people can borrow against the value of the collateral, has only been around 25-35 percent in Korea, less than half that of the US. Low loan-to-value ratio in Korea also forces young households to partly collateralize their parental assets. This, in turn, implies that when households buy the house, they need as high as 75% of the value of the house as an upfront downpayment. Table 3 summarizes the household credit and mortgage markets in the two countries. 
Summarizing Empirical Evidence
From the data shown in this section, we can list a few stylized facts on the household wealth and intergenerational transfers in the two countries.
• Lifecycle estimate of wealth profile shows that 1. wealth peaks earlier and decumulates faster after the peak in Korea than in the United States 2. younger Korean households hold more wealth than the corresponding cohorts in the United States, while for older households, the relation is reversed.
• Estimate of transfer wealth shows that 1. on average, more households in Korea receive positive parental transfers than in the United States 2. the relative importance of transfer income is larger for Korean households, especially in the younger cohorts aged less than 35.
• The degree of credit constraint in Korea is larger as evidenced from the size of the mortgage market and the down-payment requirements.
Model
In this section, I formulate the model set-up. Following the stylized facts shown in the previous section, the model will have enough parsimonious features to capture the stylized facts. In an economy with perfect capital market, agents can fully borrow against their lifetime income when they are young, therefore the timing of transfers becomes irrelevant. However, with market imperfections, especially with larger credit constraint in the early part of the life cycle, as children are unable to borrow to smooth their lifetime consumption, parents would rather draw their wealth and help out their credit-constrained children. The model is similar to the set-up of Nishiyama (2002) [25] in the sense that parents give intervivos transfer 6 as well as bequest. However, the motive for the two transfers are different. While intervivos transfers are geared towards the poor children, thus making the transfer motive altruistic, bequest is more ambiguous whether it is strategic or purely altruistic. Therefore, we take a neutral stance by assuming a 'warm-glow' approach to leaving bequest. This type of impure altruism is introduced by Andreoni (1989) [2] . In the model set-up, I also pay attention to the role of borrowing constraints in accounting for the timing of intergenerational transfers.
Demographics
Households 7 live for 12 periods at most, with each period representing 5 years. They are enter life cycle at the age 25 (j = 1) with zero asset and no labor income but possibly some intervivos transfer from their parent generation. When agents are 55 (j = 7), their children enter into the life cycle. Agents work until the age of 70 (j = 9) after which 6 The model abstracts from transfers from children to parents. This 'upstream' transfer is reported to be not quite significant in the United States at least.
7 I will use the term households and agents interchangeably.
they are retired and face positive and increasing mortality risk. The exogenously given survival probability at age j + 1 conditional on being alive at age j is denoted by s j .
The unconditional survival probability for an agent aged j is thus given by j t=1 s t . Since death is certain after age J, s J = 0. When people die, the remaining assets will be left as bequest. There is no population growth in the economy and the new agents entering into lifecycle exactly replaces the number of agents not being able to survive until the next period. In addition, the model abstracts from the changes in the family size over the life cycle or existence of annuities market.
Technology
There is one type of good produced by a single perfectly competitive firm according to the aggregate production function with Cobb-Douglas technology
where K and L are capital stock and labor input, respectively. The final good is either consumed (C), taken as government expenditure (G), or invested (I), where the law of motion for capital is K = (1 − δ)K + I. The profit-maximizing conditions lead to the net return on capital and labor equal to the respective marginal products.
where δ is the depreciation rate on physical capital.
Preference and Intergenerational Transfers
Preferences are assumed to be time separable, with a constant discount factor β. The utility function is given as a constant relative-risk aversion type, u(c) =
. Agents also derive utility from bequests, q, left upon death. This 'warm glow' bequest motive is a simple way to incorporate bequest into the model without introducing the complexities of strategies between parents and children. As for the utility derived from leaving bequests, q, we follow the specification made by De Nardi (2004) [13] denoted as:
The term ϕ 1 reflects the parent's concern about leaving bequests to children, while ϕ 2 measures the extent to which bequests are luxury goods. It is assumed that bequests are seized by the government and equally redistributed to all people between the ages of 40
and 55 (j = 4, 5, 6).
Every parent also cares about the consumption of their children directly when the children enter into lifecycle and relatively 'young' (from 25 to 40,j = 1, 2, 3). 8 This corresponds to the ages between 55 and 70 for the parent (j = 7, 8, 9). I assume that children take the resources they receive from their parents as given. Parents incorporate the children's actions when making their decisions. Children receive whatever transfers are given and make optimal decisions to the given level of parental transfers. Thus in these periods, the utility of the parents is given as
where γ is the discount factor for the utility of the children in the same period, which effectively measures the degree of parental altruism. Note that intergenerational altruism shows in two different channels; either parents give transfers intervivos (denoted as tr) when the children enters into the life cycle, or leave bequest after retirement upon death, which will be available to the children next period (denoted as q).
Labor Productivity Shock
Working agents are endowed with one unit of time which they supply inelastically. Agents also face the same exogenous age-efficiency profile, j , during their working years. This profile is estimated from the data and recovers the fact that productive ability changes 8 I denote children's age with a tilde(˜) sign.
over the life cycle. Each unit of effective labor is paid the wage rate ω. Each period working households also receive a stochastic shock to their productivity level y j ∈ E = In the first period, the agent inherits the productivity shock of the parents according to a transition function Q yh , defined on (Y, B(Y )). What the children inherit is only their first draw; from next period onwards, their productivity y j evolves stochastically according to Q y . The total productivity of a worker of age j is given by the product of the worker's stochastic productivity in that period and the worker's deterministic efficiency index at the same age: j y j .
Market Arrangements
I assume there are no state contingent markets for household specific shocks. Households hold financial assets a that pay a net interest rate r. For borrowing constraints, I assume that working agents can borrow upto some fraction of their current period income. For agents in the early stages of their lifecycle (j = 1, 2, 3), I assume that they can also partially collateralize asset of their parents.
where a −1 j+6 denote the asset of the parents aged j + 6 and I j=1,2,3 is an indicator with value 1 if the agent is aged between 20 and 35.
For retired households, assets or bequests cannot be negative, thus,
Government
One role of the government is to take away the bequest and re-distribute equally to children in periodsj = 4, 5, 6. Thus, the transfer, T , would be equal to:
Government also provides social security benefits, b, to retired households using the payroll tax collected on the working households, with the tax rate denoted as τ ss . This would lead to the following:
ω y m * (dx) (6) Finally, revenues from consumption tax and capital income tax are used for government expenditure G.
Household Problem
The state variables for the households differ according to which period in the lifecycle the households are in. The lifecycle stages will be clustered into four subperiods: j = 1, 2, 3 when agents work and may receive transfers from parents, j = 4, 5, 6 when agents work and receive equally distributed bequest, t = 7, 8, 9 when agents work and become parents and may give transfers to children, and t = 10, 11, 12 when agents are retired and may die next period with their assets taken as bequests. While the model essentially captures a lifecycle framework, the interaction between parents and children take an important role and we highlight the joint interaction of the generations by looking at the value functions of parents and children in different lifecycle stages. For notation, the state variables for parents are denoted as (a, y) and for children (ã,ỹ), where a denotes financial assets carried from the last period and y denotes the productivity.
3.7.1 Retired Parents (j = 10, 11, 12) and Children (j = 4, 5, 6) Retired parents receive pension benefit, b, and may not survive until the next period as they face positive mortality shocks, with the survival probability denoted as s. Upon death, the remaining assets are left as bequest. Since parents have 'warm glow' approach to leaving bequest, they derive utility from the amount of bequest left for their children.
The state variable for the retired parents is simply their assets brought from the previous period. The value function for retired parents are as follows:
For children, they don't have information on the bequest left by their parents as the amount is taken away by the government and equally redistributed as transfers T . Since the children are in working age, they can use a fraction κ 1 of their current income as collateral to borrow. The state variables for the children in periodsj = 4, 5, 6 are the assets brought up from the previous period as well as their productivity level.
2 Parents at (j = 7, 8, 9) and Children at (j = 1, 2, 3)
Parents are working and directly care about the consumption of their children, and may give transfers. The transfers will be dependent on the asset level and the productivity of both the parents and the children. As parents have full information on the state of their children, the state variables include their own asset and productivity but also those of their children, {a, y,ã,ỹ}. For parents in period j = 9, they retire next period and are not subject to stochastic productivity shocks nor considerations for their children's consumption. The value function for parents are as follows:
Children in periodsj = 1, 2, 3 are subject to transfers from parents. They will take the transfer as given and choose their consumption and asset for the next period. Since the transfer from parents depend on the asset and productivity of both the parents and the children, the state variables are denoted as {a, y,ã,ỹ}. They can also borrow against a fraction κ 1 of their current income but also a fraction κ 2 of their parents' asset.
Stationary Equilibrium
A stationary equilibrium is given by government policy arrangements {T, G, τ SS , τ c , τ k }; a set of prices {r, w}; value functions V (x); and allocations c(x), a (x), tr(x); a timeinvariant distribution of agents over the state variables x = {j, a, y,ã,ỹ}, m * (x); and aggregate quantities {Y, C, K, L} such that given prices and the government policies:
(i) the functions V (x), c(x), a (x), tr(x) solve the dynamic maximization problem of the households.
(ii) factor prices are equal to their marginal products:
(iii) the government policy satisfies (5), (6), (7). (vi) all markets clear.
Calibration
The set of parameters will be divided into those that can be estimated independently of the model or are based on estimates provided by other literature and data, and those that are chosen such that the predictions generated by the model can match a given set of targets. All parameters were adjusted to the five year span that each period in the model represents. For the first group of calibrated parameters, Table 4 lists the parameters chosen to be common across the two countries. 
The relative risk aversion coefficient, σ, is taken from Attanasio, et al. (1999) [5] , which falls in the range commonly used in the macroeconomics literature. In the aggregate production function, α, the share of income attributed to physical capital, is calibrated at 23.7% in both countries. The annual depreciation rate of the capital stock is 4.2%.
For the bequest parameter, φ 1 governs the degree in which parents care about leaving bequest, while φ 2 measures the degree in which bequest is considered as a luxury good.
The bequest parameters are taken from De Nardi (2004) [13] , which tries to match the transfer wealth share of 60% in the United States as found in Gale and Scholz (1994) [15] and the ratio of average bequest in the lowest 30% percentile to median household income in the United States. The replacement ratio for retirement benefit was taken to be 40% of the average income and the consumption tax rate was 5%. The conditional survival probabilities for households until the age of 70 were assumed to be 1. For households aged more than 70, the probabilities are taken from Bell, Wade and Goss (1992) [7] commonly applied over both countries.
The logarithm of the stochastic productivity process is assumed to be an AR(1) following Huggett (1996) [19] .
The disturbance term µ t is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ 2 y . The persistence parameter ρ for the United States is taken from estimates by De Nardi (2004) [13] . For Korea, it is assumed that the persistence parameter is identical to the case of the United States. The productivity shocks are discretized into a four-state Markov chain according to Tauchen and Hussey (1991) [26] . The resulting values for the productivity process are {0.2594, 0.6513, 1.5355, 3.8547} for the United States and {0.2941, 0.7438, 1.3444, 2.5373} for Korea, respectively. The transition matrix Q y and the productivity inheritance matrix Q yh are given by: [20] , which reports the maximum loan-to-value ratios of 89% and 30% for the United States and Korea, respectively. For κ 2 , due to lack of available data on parental collateral, I take a value of 0 for both countries and relax this constraint later on in the policy experiment section. The variance term in the productivity process, σ 2 y , in the US is taken from estimates by De Nardi (2004) [13] . For Korea, I adjust and re-scale to match the Gini coefficient for earnings in Korea. The deterministic age-efficiency profile j , for the United States is taken from the estimate of the mean ageincome profile from Hansen (1993) [17] . The corresponding age-efficiency profile in Korea is adjusted accordingly taking into account the difference in the retirement age. As for tax rates, the social security payroll tax rate was chosen to match the replacement ratio of 0.4. Since the retirement age in Korea is earlier than the United States (60 vs. 65), the tax burden on the working households is subsequently higher. The tax rate on capital income, τ k , was chosen so that the government balances budget and its expenditure is fixed at 20% of total GDP in each countries.
The next set of parameters were chosen such that the predictions generated by the model can match a given set of targets, specifically, some aggregate ratios in the data. Table 6 shows the parameters used to match some given set of targets in the data in each country. The discount factor, β, was calibrated to match the capital-output ratios in each country. For the United States, the capital-output ratio was 3.173, whereas for Korea the ratio was 2.448. The intergenerational discount factor, γ was chosen to match the ratio of intervivos transfer to total bequests. The ratio was 0.28 for the US and 0.91 for Korea.
In this section, the results from the benchmark simulation for the United States and Korea are presented and the fit of the model is evaluated along the dimensions not specifically matched by model construction such as age-wealth profile, intergenerational transfers given to respective cohorts, and wealth distribution.
United States
To begin with, Table 7 reports the summary statistics of the benchmark simulation and the data. [10] . The reported Gini coefficient of 0.75 is closer than the values predicted by standard life-cycle models or dynastic models. Table 8 reports the summary statistics of the benchmark simulation and the data for Korea. 
Korea

Policy Experiments
Given the results shown in the benchmark results, we move on to conduct various counterfactual policy experiments and analyze the quantitative effects on aggregate ratios, intergenerational transfers and wealth by age, prices, welfare, and wealth inequality. All the other calibrated parameters remained unchanged.
Role of Borrowing Constraint
One case is to see whether the borrowing constraint for younger households would impact the profile of wealth and intergenerational transfers as well as the overall welfare level.
To simulate different degrees of borrowing constraint, I change the borrowing constraint parameter κ 1 from 0.75 to 0.25 for the United States and from 0.25 to 0.75 for Korea. Table   9 shows the change in the aggregate ratios, tax rates, intergenerational transfers, welfare, and the interest rate. For intergenerational transfers, we report the change in average bequest (T ), and intervivos transfers given for children at period 1,2, and 3 (tr 1 , tr 2 , tr 3 ).
As for aggregate ratios, tighter (looser) borrowing constraint leads to higher (lower) capital output ratio, although the quantitative magnitude is small. For the US, changing κ 1 from 0.75 to 0.25 leads to an increase in the capital output ratio of 0.6%, and for Korea, changing κ 1 from 0.25 to 0.75 leads to a decrease in the capital output ratio of 0.4%. Wealth implications are different across age-groups as tighter borrowing constraint leads to higher wealth for younger household aged up to 55, whereas households aged 55 For intergenerational transfers, tighter borrowing constraint leads to lower bequest left due to lower level of wealth during retirement and death. For the US, average bequest falls by 4%. On the other hand, average bequest rises by 6% in Korea. Overall intervivos transfers rise in the US and Korea, but possibly for different reasons. While tighter borrowing constraint leads to higher level of intervivos transfer, it also leads to re-distribution of wealth across age groups and reduces the wealth gap between young and old cohorts, reducing the need to provide transfers. As a result, the overall transfer-to-bequest ratio increases in both countries.
As for intervivos transfers to different cohorts in the US, not only do parents give more transfers while they are alive, but also shift their intervivos transfers to children who are more likely to be constrained. Transfers given to cohorts aged 25-30 and 30-35 increase by 85% and 6%, respectively, at the expense of lower transfers to cohorts aged 35-40. In
Korea, relaxing the borrowing constraint leads to a reduction of transfers to cohorts aged 
Collateralizing Parental Asset
Next experiment looks at the role of using parental asset for partial collateralization by changing the parameter κ 2 value, initially set at zero in benchmark, to 0.25, enabling children to borrow up to 25% of the assets held by their parents. Enabling parental assets as partial collateral implies relaxing borrowing constraint for the children. Aggregate implications are similar to the case of relaxing borrowing constraint in the previous section, with lower capital output ratio. Quantitatively, the ratio declines 1.9% and 0.3% in the US and Korea, respectively. However, wealth implications are different across age-groups. In the US, wealth level decreases for all age groups, with the youngest cohort facing the largest decline. In Korea, on the other hand, re-distribution of wealth favors the older households as cohorts aged above 55 have higher level of wealth.
Similar to the US, the youngest cohort faces largest decline in wealth.
For intergenerational transfers, partial collateral leads to lower bequest in the US (-2.6%) but higher bequest in Korea (2.2%), which reflects the change in the level of wealth held by the retired households. Similarly, overall intervivos transfers fall in the US (-5.5%) while rising in Korea (5.0%).
As for intervivos transfers to different cohorts in the US, while parents give less transfers to all cohorts, the fall is larger for younger households. Transfers given to cohorts Finally, given revenue neutrality assumption, relaxing borrowing constraint leads to lower capital income taxes. Tax rates fall by 0.6% points and 0.2% points in the US and Korea, respectively. Relaxing borrowing constraint do not lead to significant implications on the interest rates and the welfare level, whereas wealth inequality rises slightly.
Eliminating Social Security Tax
Next experiment looks at privatizing social security arrangements, by lowering the replacement ratio from 40% to 0% and eliminating the social security payroll tax. Table 11 shows the change in the aggregate ratios, tax rates, intergenerational transfers, welfare, and the interest rate. Eliminating social security implies getting rid of mandatory savings for future retirement. In the aggregate, eliminating social security increases savings in the form of interest bearing assets as evidenced by higher capital output ratios in both countries. The capital output ratio rises by 15% in the US and 21% in Korea, respectively. For wealth across age groups, for both countries, the wealth of the youngest cohorts aged 25-40 are almost halved, while the wealth of other cohorts increase. For intergenerational transfers, higher level of wealth accumulation during the retirement subsequently leads to higher level of bequests in both countries. Average bequest rises by 6% in the US and 30% in Korea. As for intervivos transfers, self-savings for future retirement leads to lower intergenerational altruism, with the level of intervivos transfers decreasing significantly in both countries. In the United States, the decrease ranges between 42% and 47%, while in Korea, the range is between 64% and 70%.
Given revenue neutrality assumption, rate of return on assets decreases and the capital income tax rate increases. Interest rates decline by 1.0% point and 1.8% points due to larger accumulation of assets, whereas tax rates increase by 37.2% points and 14.2% points in the US and Korea, respectively. For welfare level in the US, there is a decline of 8% while there is an increase of 5% in Korea. Finally, the Gini coefficients decrease by approximately 4% points in both countries.
Raising Consumption Tax under Revenue-Neutrality
The next two experiment conducts revenue-neutral fiscal policies. First policy analyzes the potential effect of raising the current consumption tax from 5% to 10%. Due to revenue neutrality, tax on assets is lowered subsequently. Table 12 shows the change in the aggregate ratios, tax rates, intergenerational transfers, and welfare. Raising consumption tax under government revenue neutrality implies lower tax rate on capital returns, which mainly affects the increase in the savings in the economy and higher capital output ratios. Quantitatively, capital output ratios increase by 5.7% and 5.2% in the US and Korea, respectively. Average wealth of all cohorts increase, with the largest gain reported among the youngest cohorts aged 25-40. For intergenerational transfers, higher level of wealth accumulation during the retirement subsequently leads to higher level of bequests in both countries, with average bequest rising by approximately 3% in both countries. Intervivos transfers to younger cohorts increase proportionally more than the increase in the average bequest, thus raising the overall transfer-to-bequest ratios in both countries. The transfer-to-bequest ratio rises by 2.2% points in the US and 5.1% points in Korea.
Higher asset accumulation lowers interest rates in both countries. Welfare declines due to lower consumption for all age groups. Finally, the Gini coefficient decreases in the US while remaining constant in Korea.
Lowering Capital Tax under Revenue-Neutrality
In this section, we look at the potential effect of lowering the capital income tax rate. Due to revenue neutrality, tax on consumption now adjusts to keep the government expenditure fixed. Table 13 shows the change in the aggregate ratios, tax rates, intergenerational transfers, and welfare. Lowering the capital tax rate by half resulted in subsequent rise in the consumption tax rate to keep government revenue unchanged. In both countries, the consumption tax rate now increases from 5% to 30%. Lower taxes on savings leads to an increase in the capital output ratio by margin of 24% in the US and 20% in Korea. Across different age groups, the proportional increase in average wealth was largest for the youngest cohorts aged between 25 and 40. A big fraction of increase in this cohort comes from larger inflow of intervivos transfer from parents. Specifically, transfers to cohorts aged between 25 and 30 more than doubles in the US (215%) and increases by 23% in Korea. As wealth level is higher during retirement, the average bequest is larger under lower capital tax. The average bequest increases by 15% and 6% in the US and Korea, respectively.
For welfare change, the lowering in the capital tax results in the biggest welfare loss due to an increase in the consumption tax rate. Finally, for wealth distribution, similar to the case of consumption tax increase, lowering capital tax rate leads to lower Gini coefficient of wealth in the US. For Korea, the distribution was not sensitive to the changes in the tax rates.
Conclusion
In this paper, the relationship between the timing of intergenerational transfers and borrowing constraints are investigated by setting up a quantitative model calibrated to reflect some key features of the United States and the Korean economy.
It is important to note that the model abstracts from several issues. First, the model abstracts from different channels of intervivos transfers, specifically, the possibility of transfers from children to parents. While this type of 'upstream' transfer is not common in the United States, it plays more important role in Korea, especially since a formal social security system was only introduced recently. Second, the model does not allow for non-altruistic transfers coming from intergenerational risk-sharing arrangements. A two-sided intergenerational transfer can arise not only from pure altruism but also from exchange motive, where parents provide transfer to children to be paid back when they are retired. The existence of both types of intergenerational transfers involves incorporating both altruistic and exchange motives, which raises several challenging questions for future research. Second, the model constructed abstracts from different taxation issues. Different tax rates on gift and inheritance may also affect the timing of transfers from parents to children. These issues as well as other possible country-specific idiosyncracies are left as further research agenda in the future.
wealth as well as other demographic factors. It's particularly useful to study intergenerational linkages since it provides information about financial transfers between family members as well as non-financial in-kind services such as number of visits children make to their parents living separately. As for the financial transfers, the KLIPS survey asks households whether they have received any financial support from their parents during the survey year. This financial support, however, does not include lump-sum transfers such as bequests which take place on a non-regular basis. 9 Since the KLIPS survey records the financial support received, we deleted cases where either one of the parents (or both)
were not alive, restricting the sample to households with only both parents of the head of the household being alive. This also restricts the age distribution of the sample with the maximum age of the head of the household being 50 years old. One unique question in the KLIPS survey is the variable 'visit'. This refers to the number of visits the household made to their parents living separately during the survey year 10 This variable is not representative of the interaction between parents vs. children as it only covers interaction between generations living apart and also does not cover the length of the visit nor other types of interaction. However, it provides a useful information for our study. For household income variable, total income is the sum of labor earnings, financial and real estate earnings, as well as transfer earnings, including both public and private transfers. After filtering out the data, the total sample was reduced to 657 households. Table 14 shows the summary statistics of the total sample used for our study. Since the main focus is on the transfers, we also show in Table 15 Just to summarize subsample of households with positive transfers described in Table   15 , it is noted that, on average, households receiving positive transfers are younger and more like to be homeowners, receive less income, and make more frequent visits to their parents.
9 KLIPS survey also asks if the household has received bequests or other private transfers subject to taxation. We did not include this amount to the financial transfer category. 10 In a more frequent case, the survey asks the frequency on a monthly basis.
Regression Results
Transfer Decision
This section outlines the basic framework to estimate how financial transfers received by children can be affected by various variables. Since the focus is on the borrowing constraints and the family interaction, the variables used in Table 14 represent some important factors determining the decision to make financial transfers.
The dependent variable is an indicator with value 1 if the household received transfers, and zero otherwise. Since the data observation incorporates households receiving transfers, the dependent variable incorporates the transfer decision made by the parents households. As for the list of the explanatory variables, first of all, the current income of the recipient is taken into account. Following Cox (1987) [11] , both altruism and exchange motive would predict a negative coefficient for the income of the recipient. In addition, being poor may indicate the existence of borrowing constraints. Not only the current income, but also permanent income matters in our specification. However, since permanent income was not directly observable, we added the education level and the age as proxy variable for permanent income. Next, as one implication of transfer decision comes from whether the household is borrowing constrained or not, variables related to borrowing constraints are also considered. Homeownership could be one indicator of whether the household is borrowing constrained or not. Another indicator used is whether the household is employed or not. Since the usual mortgage lending practice is that the per-period mortgage payment cannot exceed a certain fraction of the current period income, it would be safe to assume that unemployed households are suffering from borrowing constraint.
Finally, the number of visits was included to measure the amount of services provided by the household to their parents who live apart. Under exchange motive, the probability of receiving a transfer is related to the amount of service rendered to the parents. Household size was included because it would be plausible to assume two implications. Larger-sized households would have less time to make visits their parents, but at the same time, since the parents want to see their grandchildren, households might make more visits. The main findings from the Probit regression is shown in Table 16 . The first column reports the Probit coefficient, and the second column reports the Z-statistics. The marginal effects dy/dx are reported in the third column.
Similar results were derived when a logit regression was conducted on the same specification. The results are shown in Table 17 .
From both the Probit and Logit estimations, we find that the income of the recipient, age, homeownership and the parent vs. children contact are all individually significant.
The income of the recipient, as measured by the log of the non-transfer income 11 , is negatively correlated to the probability of receiving transfer. Same negative correlation holds between age and the probability of transfers. The younger the household, the higher the probability of receiving transfers. On the other hand, children's visit to their parents are positively correlated to the probability of receiving transfers, which is consistent with exchange motives. Finally, the homeownership is positively correlated to the probability of receiving transfers. Since the homeownership is a discrete variable, it's unclear whether this can be interpreted as a homeowner having higher probability of receiving transfers or as the shift from renter to homeowner will increase the probability or receiving transfers.
Summarizing these findings, it occurs that transfers are being targeted to young but less well-off households who make more frequent visits to their parents.
Transfer Amount
As for the actual amount of transfers received, we first run a simple OLS regression with two different specification for the dependent variable. As shown in Table 18 , we used the fraction of transfer income out of total income for the first specification and the actual transfer income amount for the second specification. In the second specification, we added the log of non-transfer income into the list of the explanatory variables.
We also run a generalized Tobit regression as a large fraction of respondents receive zero transfers from their parents. In this case, it is well-documented that the OLS estimates can become biased and inconsistent. In Table 19 , we show the results from the Tobit regression.
From the generalized Tobit regression, there is a common evidence of age and the number of visits being statistically significant variables in the specification. The actual amount of transfer or the transfer income as a fraction of total income is negatively correlated to the age of the household, but positively correlated to the number of visits. Under altruistic transfer motive, the income of the transfer recipient has negative coefficient.
However, the results from the Tobit regression show that the negative coefficient for the non-transfer income is not statistically significant.
Children's Service as Dependent Variable
Finally, we run a simple OLS regression with the number of visits as the dependent variable. Looking at the sign of the coefficient with respect to the income of the transfer recipient, Cox (1987) [11] argues that altruism implies the coefficient to be zero whereas under the exchange regime, the sign would be negative. The results of the regression are shown in Table 20 .
From the regression results, the statistically significant variables turned out to be the age, transfer income and the homeownership. The number of visits that respondents make to their parents were positively associated with the transfer income they receive. As for homeownership variable, we can either interpret it as homeowners being more frequently visiting their parents or as the transition from renter to homeowner will increase the frequency of visit to the parents. Finally, younger households are more like to make more frequent visits to their parents.
Appendix: Computation
Since there is no closed form solution to the model, the stationary equilibrium of the model is solved numerically to work out optimal decision rules as a function of the state variables. The optimal decision rules were found by backward induction, starting at the terminal period T and working all the way recursively to the initial period. In period T , the value functions coincide with the sum of the period utility function and the bequest function, and, given the realization of the state variables, the consumption and bequest choices are trivial. Based on the period J policy functions, in every period prior to J, the values associated with the different choices of consumption and asset choices were obtained subsequently. For choices of control variables that violate various constraints, a large negative utility is given so that an optimizing household would never opt for these choices. The realization of the earnings process are approximated using a Markov process following Tauchen and Hussey (1991) [26] . The state space for assets was discretized into a finite number of grid points.
a ∈ {a min , . . . , 0, . . . , a max } Whenever the upper limit for the grids turned out to be binding in the solution to the problem, the upper and lower bounds were increased and the problem was solved again.
In the end, the boundaries for the grids became sufficiently large and no longer imposed any constraint on the optimization process.
Solving for the stationary equilibrium, I take the following steps similar to the method introduced by Nishiyama (2006):
1. Make a guess on the interest rate r 0 and use the factor market equilibrium conditions 12 to obtain ω 0 .
2. Make a guess on the bequest received. Bequest is assumed to be seized by the government and re-distributed equally among agents in periods 4 to 6. (35 to 50) 3. Make a guess on the marginal value function in period 7.
∂dV 7 (a,y) ∂da 4. Solve the last 3 period problem of the parents (t = 10 − 12) in (8) .
5. Solve for periodst = 4, 5, 6 problem of the children starting from period 6 as shown in (9) . In period 6, the marginal value function in the next period is taken from the guess made at (3).
6. Make a guess on transfers received (in period 3) by children and the parents choice perceived by children.
7. Solve period 3 problem of the children (t = 3) taking guessed transfer and parents' choice as given in (11).
8. Solve period 9 problem of the parents (t = 9) taking children's consumption and transfers as given in (10). Otherwise, go to the next step.
10. Iterate backwards in periodst = 1, 2 for children and t = 7, 8 for parents.
11. Compare the guessed marginal value function with the actual marginal value function found in period t = 7. If they are sufficiently different, then update the marginal value function and go back to step 3. Otherwise, go to the next step.
12. With all the value function and decision rules calculated, find the stationary distribution of households. Find the average bequest and update the guessed bequest with the calculated bequest, and go back to step 2.
13
. If the bequest level converges, find the aggregate quantities and calculate the factor price r 1 using the aggregate capital stock K and labor input L, and compare with the initial values r 0 . If the difference is sufficiently small, an equilibrium is found.
If not, go to step 1 with updated factor prices. 
